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A PROBLEM OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER: FISHER v.
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I.
The first statute to divide the crime of murder into degrees was
enacted in Pennsylvania on April 22, 1794.' Murder in the first degree
was defined as follows:
"That all murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, de-
liberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in
the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery,
or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree."
In a recent article' the history of this statute was traced and it was
shown that it was the intention of the Assembly to give the words
"deliberate" and "premeditated" their ordinary meaning.4
t A.B., 1899, Franklin and Marshall College; LL.B., 1906, Harvard University;
LL.D., 1926, Franklin and Marshall College, 1950, University of Pennsylvania; Pro-
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Law School 1940-1945; author of The Declite of Traditionalism and Individualism, 65
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85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 761 (1937) ; A Petition of Right: Archer-Shee v. the King, 87
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1. 80 U.S. App. D.C. 96, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945); 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
A petition for rehearing was denied, 329 U.S. 818 (1946).
2. 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 242 (Pa. 1794).
3. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvaia Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97
U. OF PA. L. REv. 759 (1949).
4. "Deliberate-formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful
thought and weighing of considerations." "Premeditate-to think on, and revolve in
the mind, beforehand; to contrive and design previously." WEBSTER, NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1949).
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A statute, similar to the Pennsylvania Act, was enacted in Virginia
in 1796 ' and in Maryland in 1809.' Since then the legislatures of 35
states have adopted statutes defining first degree murder. The statutes
of Connecticut,7 Iowa,' Kansas,' Michigan,10 Missouri,"1 Montana,1 2
New Jersey 's and Vermont 14 employ the following wording from the
Pennsylvania statute of 1794: "by poison or lying in wait, or by any
other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing." In Arizona,15
California, 6 Colorado,' Idaho,"3 Nevada,'9 New Mexico 2 o and North
Dakota 21 the same wording is used except that "torture" is added to
"poison or lying in wait." In North Carolina " "imprisonment, starv-
ing or torture" is added, and in West Virginia 23 "imprisonment or
starving." In New Hampshire 24 "lying in wait" is omitted while
"starving or torture" is added. In Arkansas,2" Rhode Island,2" Ten-
nessee 27 and Utah 2 "malicious" is added to "wilful, deliberate and
premeditated."
In New York 29 the killing must result from a "deliberate and pre-
meditated design to effect death," while Florida, 0 Minnesota,,' Wash-
ington 82 and Wisconsin 8 s require only a "premeditated design." In
Alabama 4 in addition to a "premeditated design" the killing must
have been done "unlawfully and maliciously." Other wordings are
"purposely and with premeditated malice" in Indiana,8 "express malice
5. Acts of Virginia c. 2, § 2 (1796).
6. Laws of Maryland, 1809 c. 138, § 3 (Kilty, Harris and Watkins).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8350 (1949).
8. IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1950).
9. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-401 (Corrick, 1935).
10. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (Henderson, 1938).
11. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4376 (1939).
12. MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 94-2503 (1947).
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:138-2 (1939).
14. VT. REV. STAT. § 8240 (1947).
15. ARiZ. CODE ANN. § 43-2902 (1939).
16. CAI. PENAL CODE pt. 1, tit. 8, c. 1, § 189 (Deering, 1941).
17. CoL. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 32 (1935).
18. IDAHO CODE vol. 4, c. 40, § 18-4003 (1948).
19. NEV. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 10068 (Hillyer, 1929).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2404 (1941).
21. N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2712 (1943).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (1943).
23. W.VA. CODE ANN. §5916 (1949).
24. N.H. Rlv. LAws c. 455, § 1 (1942).
25. ARE:. STAT. ANN. § 41-2205 (1947).
26. R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 606, § 1 (1938).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10768 (Williams, 1934).
28. UTAH CODE ANN. § 103-28-3 (1943).
29. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (1944).
30. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1949).
31. MINN. STAT. § 619.07 (Henderson, 1949).
32. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2392 (Remington, 1932).
33. Wis. STAT. §340.02 (1947).
34. AiA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 314 (1940). The section also includes "poison, lying
in wait and any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing."
35. IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-3401 (Burns, 1933).
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aforethought" in Delaware, 6 "deliberately premeditated malice afore-
thought or with extreme atrocity or cruelty" in Massachusetts,"7 "pur-
posely and of deliberate and premeditated malice" in Nebraska 88 and
Oregon,"9 "purposely and with premeditated malice . . . or by ad-
ministering poison or causing the same to be done" in Wyoming 4 0 and
"purposely and either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means
of poison" in Ohio. 1
It is important for the present discussion to trace the history of
the sections on first degree murder in the District of Columbia Code,
which are as follows:
"Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills an-
other purposely, either of deliberate and premeditated malice or
by means of poison . . . is guilty of murder in the first degree.
"Whoever maliciously places an obstruction upon a railroad
or street railroad, or displaces or injures anything appertaining
thereto, or does any other act with intent to endanger the passage
of any locomotive or car, and thereby occasions the death of
another, is guilty of murder in the first degree."'
In November, 1895, the Board of Trade of Washington, D. C.
invited Justice Walter S. Cox of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia to prepare a code for the District of Columbia.' Judge Cox
36. DEL. REV. CODE § 5157 (1935).
37. MASS. ANx. LAWS, c. 265, § 1 (1933).
38. NEB. REV. STAT. vol. 2, § 28-401 (1943).
39. ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 23-401 (1940).
40. Wyo. Coup. STAT. ANS. § 9-201 (1945).
41. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 12400 (Page, 1938).
42. D.C. CODE §§22-2401 and 22-2402 (1940). The D.C. CODE was enacted in
1901, 31 STAT. c. 854. The sections on first degree murder were then numbered 798
and 799.
43. A number of previous efforts, three of which are of interest in the present
connection, were made to secure the enactment of a code of laws for the District
of Columbia. In 1816 Congress passed an act authorizing the judges of the Circuit
Court and the attorney for the District of Columbia to prepare a code of jurisprudence,
both civil and criminal, for the District and to submit the draft of the code to Con-
gress. Acts of the 14th Congress, 1st Sess., c. 143, April 29, 1816. judge Cranch,
one of the judges of the Circuit Court, presented on Nov. 19, 1818 to the Hon. Henry
Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the draft of a code, prepared by him-
self, stating that the other officials, specified in the act of April 29, 1816, were pre-
vented by their engagements from participating in the drafting of the code. Code
of Laws for District of Columbia, 3 (1819). It was provided in the code that no
crime should be punished by death, the penalty for murder being imprisonment for
not less than two nor more than twenty years. Id. at 235. Congress did not adopt
this code.
A joint committee of Congress, appointed in 1832 by a Resolution of the 22nd
Congress, presented on February 23, 1833 "A System of Civil and Criminal Law
for the District of Columbia." The punishment for murder, recommended in this
draft, was solitary confinement for life. SEN. Doc. No. 85, 22nd Cong., 2nd Sess.
384. This code was not adopted by Congress.
In 1855 Congress passed a statute providing that the President of the United
States should appoint two persons learned in the law to codify the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and further providing that after the draft of the Code was com-
pleted and distributed a vote of the citizens of the District should be taken to deter-
mine whether the Code should be adopted. Act of Mar. 3, 1855, 10 STAT. 642. The
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accepted this invitation and prepared the draft of a code which was
privately printed in 1898."4 In the preface to this draft Judge Cox
stated the following:
"The chapter on crimes and punishments is, in some respects,
important. It creates degrees in the crime of murder, which do
not exist here now and it gives definitions of the different kinds of
homicide, after the statutes of New York." "
The provision on first degree murder, as drafted by Judge Cox,
was as follows:
"Homicide, when not justifiable, is murder in the first degree,
whether effected by direct violence, poisoning, starvation, exposure,
or other means, when:
"First.-It is committed from a deliberate design to effect
the death of the person killed or of another.
"Second.-It is committed by one engaged in the commission
of, or attempt to commit, any felony; . . .
"Third.-When it is an act imminently dangerous to others
and committed with a reckless disregard of human life." "
This with several changes of wording followed the corresponding
provision of the New York Code.47
After Judge Cox had completed the draft of the Code it was re-
ferred by the Board of Trade to its Committee on Legislation and by
the Bar Association of the District to its Legal Committee.4" The latter
committee studied the whole code and agreed upon a number of
changes. After the committee had completed its revision, the judges
of the District, including Judge Cox, met with the members of the com-
President appointed, as draftsmen of the Code, Robert Ould and William B. B.
Cross of the District of Columbia Bar. The Code, as drafted, divided murder into
degrees and defined first degree murder in part as follows: "If any person shall
purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice . . . or by administering poison
. . . kill another." Rev. Code of D.C. 1857, pt. IV, tit. II, c. 130, § 1. This pro-
vision followed the wording of the Ohio Act. At the election held in 1857, in
accordance with the provision of the statute of 1855, the code was not adopted. The
vote was 1576 for, and 3110 against, the proposed code. EXEc. Doc. No. 74, 35th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5.
44. WALTER S. Cox, CODE OF LAW FOR THE DisTRIcT OF COLUMBIA. Printed by
Thomas W. Cadick in Washington, D.C., 1898 for the Bar Association and the
Board of Trade of Washington. A copy of this book was located in the Public
Library of the District of Columbia.
45. Id. Preface, p. xi.
46. Id. at 297.
47. The corresponding provision of the New York statute read as follows:
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder
in the first degree, when committed either
1. From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death of the per-
son killed, or of another; or
2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life. . . . N.Y. PENAL CODE § 183, 3 Laws 1881, p. 44."
48. 9 REP. WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE 21 (1899). See also D.C. CODE,
Historical (Introduction) xiv (1940).
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mittee and considered the revised draft. Additional modifications were
suggested by the judges. After further discussion the members of the
Committee and the judges "finally agreed upon the terms of every
section of the code with the understanding that in the form in which
it was then left, it should be introduced in Congress and printed, and
that thereupon a second revision should be made in substantially the
same way." " Accordingly a bill embodying the proposed code was
introduced in the Senate on February 18, 1899.50
The provision on first degree murder in the Senate bill was
markedly different from the section as drafted by Judge Cox. The
provision in the Senate bill was in two sections, the first of which read
as follows: "Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, pur-
posely, and either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means
of poison . . . kills another is guilty of murder in the first degree and
shall suffer death." 5" This section, with the addition of the require-
ment of "sound memory and discretion" is in the exact wording of
the corresponding provision of the Ohio statute.52 The second section,
which with two slight changes of wording likewise followed the Ohio
statute,53 was as follows: "Whoever maliciously places an obstruction
upon a railroad or street railroad, or displaces or injures anything
appertaining thereto, or does any other act with intent to endanger the
passage of any locomotive or car, and thereby occasions the death of
another, is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall suffer death." "
. After the Senate bill was printed the committee of the Bar Asso-
ciation made a number of changes, which were considered by a joint
committee composed of the members of the Bar Association committee
and a committee of the judges of the District.55 When agreement was
reached by the joint committee the revised draft was introduced as a
bill in the House of Representatives on March 21, 1900. The pro-
vision on first degree murder in the House bill was in the exact word-
ing of the provisions of the Senate bill except that the last four words,
"and shall suffer death," at the end of both sections were omitted.56
The House bill was passed on May 28, 1900 5' and was introduced in
49. H.R. REP. No. 1017, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (April 14, 1900).
50. S. 5530, 55th Cong. 3rd Sess. 174 (1899).
51. Ibid.
52. 2 OHIo REV. STAT. § 6808 (1880).
53. The section of the Ohio statute, on which the section of the Senate bill was
based, read as follows: "Whoever maliciously places an obstruction upon a railroad,
or displaces or injures anything appertaining thereto, with intent to endanger the
passage of any locomotive or car, and thereby occasions the death of another, is
guilty of murder in the first degree, and shall be punished accordingly." Id. § 6809.
54. S. 5530, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess. 174 (1899).
55. 10 REP. WASHINGToN BOARD OF TRADE 138 (1900).
56. H.R. 9835, 56th Cong. 1st Sess., §§ 798 and 799 (1900).
57. 33 CoNr. REc. 6182 (1900).
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the Senate on May 31, 1900 "" where it was passed on March 2, 1901." o
It was signed by the President on the following day.
An extensive investigation ' has failed to show why the Ohio pro-
vision on first degree murder was substituted for the section drafted
by Judge Cox, which followed the New York statute. It is clear that
Judge Cox had studied the Ohio statutes, for he so stated in a letter
to the Board of Trade."' No reason has been discovered for adding
the requirement of "sound memory and discretion." This added re-
quirement has particular significance, since it is not found in any other
statute on first degree murder.
Since deliberation and premeditation are elements of first degree
murder under most statutes the basic proposition is that they must be
proved affirmatively by the prosecution and that any evidence tending
to show the absence of either of them is relevant and must be considered
by the jury in reaching a verdict."2 Thus it has been held that evi-
dence of feeblemindedness,' provocation,64 influence of drugs 65 and
passion induced by various causes 66 should be admitted and weighed
58. 33 CONG. REc. 6265 (1900).
59. 34 CONG. REc. 3497 (1901).
60. The following sources of information were consulted: Library of Congress,
Senate Library, Washington Public Library, Library of D.C. Bar Association and
the Washington Board of Trade.
61. REP,. WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE 23 (Nov. 14, 1898).
62. "The word 'deliberate' is derived from two Latin words, which mean,
literally, 'concerning,' and 'to weigh.' When used as an adjective in the English,
it means that the manner of the performance was determined upon after examination
and reflection-that the consequences, chances and means were weighed, carefully
considered and estimated. The term 'premeditated' literally means plan, contrive
or scheme beforehand. Considering these definitions, the intention of the lawgiver
must be very apparent. It is not only necessary that the accused shall plan, contrive
and scheme, as to the means and manner of the commission of the deed, but that he
shall consider different 'means of accomplishing the act. He must 'weigh' the modes
of consummation which his premeditation suggests, and determine which is the most
feasible. Such is the literal import of the terms used, and there is nothing in the act
which indicates that they are to be understood in a different sense ...
"The deliberation and premeditation must be proved as well as the malice.
They are never, by the law, presumed or implied." Crozier, C. J. in Craft v. State,
3 Kan. 450, 483, 486, 487 (1866).
To same effect see Ezell v. State, 102 Ala. 101, 112, 15 So. 810, 814 (1893)
People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 898, 156 P.2d 7, 17 (1945).
63. "Feebleness of mind or will, even though not so extreme as to justify a finding
that the defendant is irresponsible, may properly be considered by the triers of the
facts in determining whether a homicide has been committed with a deliberate and
premeditated design to kill, and may thus be effective to reduce the grade of the
offense." Per Curiam, in People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 180, 163 N.E. 553 (1928).
Accord: State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145 (1920). Contra: Commonwealth v. Scott,
14 Pa. D. & C. 191 (1930).
64. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 903, 156 P.2d 7, 19 (1945).
65. State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72 (1913) ; State v. Close, 106 N.J.L.
321, 148 At. 764 (1930) semble.
66. Passion produced by insult, Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 455 (1886);
People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256, 43 N.E. 635 (1896) ; State v. Jackson, 344 Mo. 1055,
130 S.W.2d 595 (1939) ; by grief and provocation, People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159
N.E. 390 (1927); by unlawful search of house, Winton v. State, 151 Tenn. 177, 268
S.W. 633 (1924); by any cause, Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876).
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by the jury. It has also been stated that "bodily disease, want of sleep
and rest," 17 "rash impulse, headlong fury, sudden and overwhelming
grief,"68 and "sudden and uncontrollable emotion" 69 and "impetuous
rage" 70 are proper matters to be considered by the jury in determining
whether the required elements of deliberation and premeditation have
been proved. The problem has most frequently arisen with regard to
voluntary intoxication and it has been held in twenty states and the
District of Columbia that this may prevent a killing from being de-
liberate and premeditated. 7' The Supreme Court of the United States
in the leading case of Hopt v. People 2 adopted this view. One of the
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is par-
ticularly significant. In Sabens v. United States it was decided that the
defendant, who formed a deliberate and premeditated design to kill the
deceased and then in pursuance of such design "voluntarily made him-
self drunk for the purpose of nerving himself for the accomplishment
of the design," could not be guilty of first degree murder if at the time
of the killing he was so intoxicated that he was unable to deliberate upon
and premeditate the murder.7'
With regard to the question whether mental disease, which ad-
mittedly does not relieve the defendant from responsibility, should be
67. State v. Close, 106 N.J.L. 321, 331, 148 Atl. 764, 769 (1929).
68. O'Brien, J. (dissenting) in People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 182, 163 N.E.
553, 554 (1928).
69. O'Brien, J. in People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256, 267, 43 N.E. 635, 638 (1896).
70. Agnew, C. J. in Green v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 75, 79 (1876).
71. People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544 (1863); People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344
(1872) ; Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 86 Pac. 79 (1906) ; State v. Johnson, 40
Conn. 136 (1873) ; State v. Kupis, 37 Del. 27, 179 Atl. 640 (1935) ; Garner v. State,
28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891) ; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123 (1890) ;
O'Neil v. State, 216 Ind. 21, 22 N.E.2d 825 (1939) ; State v. Wilson, 234 Iowa 60, 11
N.W.2d 737 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Parsons, 195 Mass. 560, 81 N.E. 291 (1907) ;
Commonwealth v. Soaris, 275 Mass. 291, 175 N.E. 491 (1931) ; Maynard v. State, 81
Neb. 301, 116 N.W. 53 (1908) ; Wilson v. State, 60 N.J.L. 171, 37 Atl. 954 (1897) ;
State v. Cooley, 19 N.M. 91, 140 Pac. 1111 (1914) ; State v. Brigance, 31 N.M. 436,
246 Pac. 897 (1926) ; People v. Leonardi, 143 N.Y. 360, 38 N.E. 372 (1894) ; People
v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926); State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80
S.E. 72 (1913) ; State v. Ross, 193 N.C. 25, 136 S.E. 193 (1927) ; Long v. State, 109
Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923); Rucker v. State, 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802
(1928) ; State v. Weaver, 35 Ore. 415, 58 Pac. 109 (1899) ; Jones v. Commonwealth,
75 Pa. 403 (1874) ; Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348 Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944) ;
Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663 (1849) ; Haile v. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.)
154 (1850); Willis v. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 929 (1879); Johnson v. Com-
monwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923); State v. Hertzog, 55 W.Va. 74, 46
S.E. 792 (1904); Sabens v. United States, 40 App. D.C. 440 (1913); McAffee v.
United States, 72 App. D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199 (1940).
Contra: State v. Dearing, 65 Mo. 530 (1877) ; State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 (1877).
72. 104 U.S. 631 (1881).
73. 40 App. D.C. 440 (1913). Contra: State v. Robinson, 20 W.Va. 713 (1882).
On page 741 Johnson, Pres. said: "A person who has formed, a willful deliberate and
premeditated design to kill another, and in pursuance of such design voluntarily makes
himself drunk for the purpose of nerving his animal courage for the accomplishment
of the design, and then meets the subject of his malice, when he is so drunk, as not
then to be able to deliberate on and premeditate the murder, and kills the person, it is
murder in the first degree."
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considered in determining if all mental requirements of first degree
murder have been established there is a marked difference of opinion
among the courts. An affirmative answer has been given to the ques-
tion in Colorado,74 Connecticut, 75 Indiana,"0 Maryland, 7 Ohio,7" Rhode
Island,79 Utah,"0 Virginia 8' and Wisconsin." The opposite conclusion
74. "To be guilty of murder of the first degree a person must not only be sane,
but in killing he must have acted wilfully, deliberately and with premeditation. Whether
he so acted is for the jury to determine after a consideration of all the facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence, including those affecting his mental condition at the time."
Butler, J. in Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 525, 22 P.2d 1109, 1112 (1933). See also
Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948).
75. Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876).
76. "It would be a legal as well as a logical incongruity to hold that the crime of
murder in the first degree could only be committed after deliberate thought or pre-
meditated malice, and yet that it might be committed by one who was without mental
capacity to think deliberately or determine rationally." Mitchell, C. J. in Aszman v.
State, 123 Ind. 347, 352, 24 N.E. 123, 125 (1890). To same effect see Everett v.
State, 208 Ind. 145, 150, 195 N.E. 77, 79 (1935). Compare Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141
(1883).
77. Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809 (1888) semble.
78. In the leading case of Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 483 (1843), the defendant was
tried for first degree murder and the defense was insanity. Two justices of the
Supreme Court presided at the trial. The charge to the jury, which was reduced to
writing and approved before delivery by all the justices of the Supreme Court, con-
tained the following:
"The statute defining this crime, is in these words :-'If any person shall pur-
posely, and of deliberate and premeditated malice, kill another, every such person shall
be guilty of murder in the first degree. The words purposely, of deliberate and pre-
meditated malice, as applied to the act of killing, have much meaning. Purposely
implies an act of the will; an intention; a design to do the act. It presupposes the free
agency of the actor. Deliberation and premteditation require action of the mind. They
are operations of the intellectual faculties, and require an exercise of reason, reflection,
judgment and decision, and cannot happen in any case where the faculties of the mind
are deranged, destroyed, or do not exist. The crime of murder in the first degree can,
therefore, only be perpetrated by a free agent, capable of acting or of abstaining from
action-free to embrace the right and to reject the wrong. lie must have a sound
intellect, capable of reason, reflection, premeditation, and under the control of the
will." At 494.
The above statement regarding deliberation and premeditation was repeated by the
trial judge in his charge to the jury in State v. Maxwell, Dayton 362, 363 (1867) and
in Cottell v. State, 12 Ohio C.C. 467, 479 (1896).
In Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555 (1846) at page 556 the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated the following: "If . . . the degree of guilt depends upon the calm and de-
liberate state of the mind at the time of the commission of the act, it is proper to show
any state or condition of the person that is adverse to the proper exercise of the mind,
and the undisturbed possession of the faculties."
79. "Assuming that defendant was not insane there is evidence that he was not in
his normal mental state. This fact, although not an excuse for the homicide, is rele-
vant on the question of the fixity and duration of the conscious intent or premedita-
tion." Stearns, J. in State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309, 315, 121 Atl. 218, 221 (1923).
80. "While the jury found that his condition in that respect was not such as to
affect his mental capacity to relieve him from responsibility, yet it may have been such*
as to affect his mental capacity to coolly deliberate and premeditate on his acts . . .
While one's mental condition may not excuse the act, it may nevertheless affect the
degree of guilt." Frick, J. in State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 145, 148 Pac. 1071, 1074
(1915).
81. Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 880 (1881) semble.
82. Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. W. 243 (1889); Hempton v. State, 111
Wis. 127, 86 N.W. 596 (1901).
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has been reached in Arizona,8 3 California,"4 Idaho,"5 Massachusetts 8'
and Missouri. In New Jersey's and Pennsylvania" 9 the opinions
83. "The degree of the crime is not dependent upon defendant's intelligence or
lack of intelligence, his power to reason or not to reason. If he knew the nature and
quality of his act and that it was wrong, he is amenable to punishment therefor to the
same extent as if he were one whose sanity is not questioned." Ross, J. in Foster v.
State, 37 Ariz. 281, 290, 294 Pac. 268, 271 (1930).
84. "The insanity of a defendant cannot be used for the purpose of reducing his
crime from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree. If responsible
at all in this respect, he is responsible in the same degree as a sane man, and if he is
not responsible at all he is entitled to an acquittal in both degrees." Waste, C. J. in
People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 47, 273 Pac. 767, 772 (1928).
The above statement was approved in People v. Cordova, 14 Cal.2d 308, 311, 94
P.2d 40, 42 (1939).
85. State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937).
86. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 106 N.E. 545 (1914). Approved in
Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 414, 198 N.E. 641, 644 (1935).
87. State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S.W. 734 (1900).
88. "If, by law, deliberation and premeditation are essential elements of the crime,
and, by reason of drunkenness or any other cause, it appears that the prisoner's mental
state is such that he is incapable of such deliberation and premeditation, then the crime
has not been committed; there is a failure on the part of the state to prove the crime
into which premeditation must enter." Van Syckel, J. in Wilson v. State, 60 N.J.L.
171, 184, 37 Atl. 954, 958 (1897). Emphasis added.
In State v. Maioni, 78 N.J.L. 339, 341, 74 AtI. 526, 528 (1900), the Court of
Errors and Appeals in affirming a judgment of conviction of first degree murder
approved by a vote of eight to five the following instruction to the jury by the trial
court:
"The insanity of the defendant can not be used for the purpose of reducing his
crime from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree. If responsible
at all in this respect, he is responsible in the same degree as a sane man, and if he is
not responsible at all, he is entitled to an acquittal in both degrees."
In State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 133 Atl. 274 (1926), the defendant was indicted
for murder in the first degree. The defense was insanity. A conviction of first
degree murder was reversed, a majority of the court being of the opinion that the
defendant was so insane as to be entirely irresponsible. Kalisch, J. in a concurring
opinion approved the statement of Van Syckel, J. in Wilson v. State, supra, and stated
the following: "The law is not the creation of such barbarous and insensible animal
nature as to extend a more lenient legal rule to the case of a drunkard, whose mental
faculties are disturbed by his own will and conduct, than to the case of a poor de-
mented creature afflicted by the hand of God. . . . Moreover, a review of the cases
cited on this topic clearly indicate that the legal rule as applied to the drunkard
charged with the commission of murder, relating to the degree of guilt, is equally
applicable to the mentally afflicted." At 694.
See State v. Rodia, 132 N.J.L. 199, 39 A.2d 484 (1944). In this case the trial
judge admitted evidence of the defendant's mental age to show that he "was incapable
of planning, premeditating or designing an intent to kill."
89. In Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874) the defendant was convicted
of murder in the first degree. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
on the ground that the murder was second degree. On page 410 Agnew, C. J. stated
the following: "Looking then at the state of Jones's mind from the 10th until the 19th
of June, and down to the very moment he fired the pistol, and, also, at the suddenness
of his quarrel with Mrs. Hughes, her call for the poker, and lifting the stool, it seems
to us a matter of grave doubt whether his frame of mind was such that he was capable
either of deliberation or premeditation. It appears to have been rather the sudden
impulse of a disordered brain, weakened by potations of laudanum and spirits, and of
a distorted mind, led away from reason and judgment by dwelling upon the conduct
of his wife, influenced by his continued state of excitement. It presents a case of the
preparation of a weapon, and an undefined purpose of violence to some one, where the
time for reflection was ample; but where the frame of mind was wanting, which would
enable the prisoner to be fully conscious of his purpose, or to resolve to take the life
of the deceased, with deliberation and premeditation." In Commonwealth v. Werling,
164 Pa. 559, 30 Atl. 406 (1894) the trial judge directed the jury to determine
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expressed in the cases are conflicting. The Supreme Court of the United
States in the leading case of Hopt v. People," decided in 1881, an-
nounced the following proposition:
"But when a statute establishing different degrees of murder re-
quires deliberate premeditation in order to constitute murder in the
first degree, the question whether the accused is in such a condition of
mind, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise,9' as to be capable of de-
liberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a material subject of con-
sideration by the jury." If the word "otherwise" is given its normal
meaning in the context, it will include mental derangement. 2
In McAffee v. United States, decided in 1940,"3 the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia, in an opinion by Miller, J., stated the
following:
"There was conflicting evidence upon the subject of appel-
lant's intoxication and of his mental condition. Under the circum-
stances the question was one of fact and was properly submitted
to the jury to determine whether, by reason of drunkenness or
otherwise, appellant's condition was such as to make him incapable
of deliberation or premeditation." "
"whether his mental condition was such as to reduce the grade of the crime from
murder of the first degree to murder of the second degree, by reason of the fact he
was incapable of that deliberation and premeditation which the law requires." At 562.
A similar instruction was given the jury in Commonwealth v. Hillman, 189 Pa. 548,
42 Atl. 196 (1899).
The contrary view was announced in Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138,
42 Atl. 542 (1899). On page 151 Dean, J. stated the following:
"Either the jury remain convinced of the prisoner's sanity, by the legal presump-
tion against him, or they are convinced of his insanity'by the preponderance of evi-
dence in his favor; there is no middle ground which the law recognizes; nor does a
doubt of sanity reduce the grade of the crime to murder of the second degree. From
the very nature of the mental disease, there can be no grading of it by degrees so as
to accord with a degree in crime." No reference was made to Jones v. Common-
wealth, supra.
Commonwealth v. Wireback was approved in Commonwealth v. Hollinger, 190
Pa. 155, 161, 42 Atl. 548, 550 (1899). A similar conclusion was reached in Common-
wealth v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 154 Atl. 483 (1931).
On page 416 Kephart, J. stated the following:
"The doctrine of partial responsibility adopted in some other states would turn
loose on society a class of dangerous citizens who, because of their legalized immunity,
would prey on other members of society without much restraint." Jones v. Common-
wealth was not cited.
In Commonwealth v. Stabinsky, where it was held that mental disorder should be
considered by the jury in determining the penalty in case of a conviction for first
degree murder, Linn, J. cited with approval the following: "Diminished responsibility
is a scientific fact, scientifically established and capable of being analyzed." 313 Pa. 231,
238, 169 Atl. 439, 442 (1933). This statement would seem to be applicable to the
present problem.
90. 104 U. S. 631 (1881).
91. Emphasis added.
92. Id. at 634. See Keedy, Insanity and Crindnal Responsibility, 30 HAv. L.
REv. 535, 552 (1917).
93. 72 App. D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199 (1940).
94. Id. at 66, 111 F.2d at 205. Emphasis added.
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It should be noted that this statement not only contains the phrase
"drunkenness or otherwise," as used by the Supreme Court in Hopt v.
People, but specifically includes "mental condition" as well as "drunken-
ness." Miller, J. repeated the language of the McAffee Case in Merg-
ner v. United States, decided in 1945." 5
II.
Julius Fisher was brought to trial in the District Court of the
United States for the District of Columbia on June 28, 1944 charged
with first degree murder in the killing of Catherine Reardon, the in-
dictment being based on the provision of the statute requiring that the
killing be committed "purposely either of deliberate and premeditated
malice" by a person "of sound memory and discretion." The fact of
the killing was admitted. The deceased was the librarian of the
Cathedral of Saint Peter and Saint Paul in Washington, D. C. The
defendant, a Negro, was the janitor of the library building. The de-
ceased had complained to the verger about the defendant's care of the
building and the verger had informed defendant of the complaint. On
the following day, when the deceased and the defendant were alone in
the library, the killing occurred. The only testimony regarding the
circumstances of the killing was that of the defendant, who testified
as follows:
"She asked me if I had dusted her desk, and I said 'Yes'.
Then she said, 'It certainly doesn't look like it.' I walked out
from behind the stacks and in front of her desk. I said, 'I have
dusted the desk. I always try to keep the place clean,' and I asked
her if she was trying to make trouble for me. I also asked her if
she had reported to the boss about her desk. She said, 'No', that
she had seen dust and dirt around her floor. She then spoke
up and said, 'You black "nigger" you should be able to keep this
place clean. That is what they are paying you for.' I got angry
at what she said. Then I smacked her. I felt like I got angry
inside. I felt like something rose up in my chest like that [in-
95. Mergner v. United States, 79 App. D.C. 373, 374, 147 F.2d 572, 573 (1945).
The Penal Codes of most Latin-American countries provide that mental derange-
ment, which is not sufficient to relieve the defendant from responsibility, may constitute
an extenuating circumstance. Argentina, bk. I, tit. V, art. 40; Brazil, tit. III, art. 22
(may cause reduction of punishment) ; Chile, bk. I, tit. I, arts. 10(1) and 11(1);
Costa Rica, bk. I, tit. II, c. IV, art. 28(2) (mental debility produced by old age) ;
Cuba, bk. I, tit. III, arts. 35(A) and 37(A) ; Ecuador, bk. I, tit. III, c. I, art. 35
(may cause reduction of penalty) ; Guatemala, bk. I, tit. I, arts. 21(1) and 22(1) ;
Honduras, bk. I, tit. I, arts. 7(1) and 8(1) ; Nicaragua, bk. I, tit. I, arts. 21(1) and
22(1); Panama, bk. I, tit. IV, art. 45; Paraguay, bk. I, arts. 18(3) and 30(1);
Peru, bk. I, tit. X, art. 90; El Salvador, bk. I, tit. I, arts. 8(1) and 9(1) ; Uruguay,
bk. I, tit. II, c. II, art. 30, and tit. III, c. I, art. 46(1) ; Venezuela, bk. I, tit. V, art.
63. JimNxEz DE .As0A, C6DIGoS PENALES IBEROAMERICANOS (1946).
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dicating]. I smacked her and she ran out from behind the desk,
around toward the back of the stacks. No white person had ever
called me a 'nigger' before. I had been called that by my own
colored people. I had never been called that before an (sic) in
opprobrium, anger or criticism. She ran out from behind her
desk, down toward the back, screaming. I started upstairs, to
run up. The screaming seemed to have gotten on my nerves. I
got scared and nervous. I was running on up the steps, with
her all the time screaming. When I got up to the top of the
steps, the noise got so loud, it kept scaring me. I ran into the
library, got the stick of wood, ran back downstairs and started to
striking her with it. The stick broke. She was still screaming,
and I began choking her then. She seemed to have become un-
conscious and I taken her by the hand and started to drag out.
When I struck her she was standing about a little table down
back of the stacks; a little table was down there on the right-
hand side, as you go down towards the window. At that time
it looked as though she had started trying to come back up
towards me. When I struck her with the stick I was not trying
to kill her, I was just trying to keep her from making a noise.
When I began choking her, I was not trying to kill her; she
started hollering and I tried to stop her from hollering. When
she went limp, she evidently fainted. She went down on the
floor. Then I began choking her because she was still hollering.
She stopped finally and I did not strike her any more after the
noise had ceased. The next thing I did was to take her by the
hand and start dragging her through the stacks. Her ring pulled
off in my hand. I dropped it in my pocket and continued to drag
her on into the bathroom, where I left her laying and dove out
the bathroom and got some toilet tissues to clean up the spots
of blood. I wanted to clean up the spots of blood because I didn't
want to leave the library dirty, leave awful spots on the floor. I
wanted to clean them up. While I was up there with the tissue
paper cleaning up the spots on the floor, she started hollering
again. She kept hollering, seemed like to me. She kept trying
to holler. I took out my knife and stuck her in the throat. My
idea was just trying to stop her from hollering, is all I can think
about. The noise kept on getting on my nerves. After that she
stopped hollering." 96
Dr. Ernest Y. Williams of the Faculty of the Howard University
Medical School was called as a witness for the defendant. He stated
that he examined the defendant on four different occasions.97 With
regard to the defendant's mental condition he testified in part as
follows:
96. Transcript of Record, 59. This testimony of the defendant was on cross-
examination. His testimony on direct examination was less detailed.
97. Id. at 87.
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"Psychiatric examination showed a limitation of information,
judgment and comprehension. I think this man shows definitely
evidence of what I call a psychopathic personality, and that the
alcoholism is but a symptom of the total picture. This picture,
so far as the psychopathic personality is concerned, shows the pre-
dominantly aggressive type of behavior, purely of an impulsive
nature." 98 On cross-examination Dr. Williams further stated:
"I doubt whether he was able to entertain an intent to kill her.
His inability to entertain that intent was partly due to a deranged
mental condition . ... You have here a psychopathic personality
associated with chronic alcoholism and with early schizoic tend-
encies. They are three diseases: a psychopathic personality,
chronic alcoholism, early schizoic tendencies. . . . At the time
Fisher killed Miss Reardon he had all the elements of an insane
person." "0 When recalled as a witness for the defense Dr. Wil-
liams testified that he found "evidence of organic disease of the
brain." 100
Dr. Edgar D. Griffin, Senior Medical Officer at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital, Washington, D. C., testified for the Government in rebuttal.
His testimony was in part as follows: "I haven't examined the de-
fendant and would not want to say definitely whether he was of sound
or unsound mind. A psychopathic personality is a person of unsound
mind." 101
After the completion of the evidence the defense requested that
the following instruction be given:
"The jury is instructed that in considering the question of
intent or lack of intent to kill on the part of the defendant, the ques-
tion of premeditation or no premeditation, deliberation or no de-
liberation, whether or not the defendant at the time of the fatal
acts was of sound memory and discretion, it should consider the
entire personality of the defendant, his mental, nervous, emotional
and physical characteristics as developed by the evidence in the
case." 102
This request was refused by the trial judge, who in his instructions
to the jury defined first degree murder as follows:
98. Id. at 89. Emphasis added.
99. Id. at 90.
100. Id. at 97.
101. Id. at 92. Emphasis added.
Before giving the above testimony Dr. Griffin testified as follows:
"I have read all the defendant's testimony as of yesterday. I was in the
courtroom today until about 11:22 and heard most of the cross-examination of
the defendant. I returned to the courtroom about 11:38 when the psychologist
was on the stand. I heard most of her testimony and all the rest of the testimony
up to the present time. I have heard nothing, read nothing about the case which
would lead me to believe that the defendant was of unsound mind." Id. at 92.
102. Id. at 102; 328 U.S. at 470n.
280 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being
purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice. The crime
involves these elements:
"First, the fatal act purposely done. Of that, nothing more
need be said.
"Second, malice.
"Third, premeditation.
"Fourth, deliberation." 103
He then defined "malice", "premeditation" and "deliberation" at
length but did not refer to the testimony to be considered by the jury
in determining whether these requirements of the statute were proved.
In defining first degree murder he did not mention the provision of
the statute requiring that the defendant be "of sound memory and dis-
cretion." 104 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
the judgment of conviction was affirmed.10 5 The opinion of the Court,
which consisted of Miller, Edgerton and Arnold, Associate Justices,
was written by Arnold, J. who did not discuss the requirements of the
statute but stated the following:
"With respect to the issue of deliberation the psychiatric tes-
timony went no further than to say that appellant was the kind of
person who was apt to conceive and carry into effect a brutal
murder of this character because of his psychiatric aggressive tend-
encies and his low emotional response to situations which would
deter ordinary men. But it is obvious that brutal murders are
not committed by normal people." 108
He made no reference to the testimony of the Government's wit-
ness that "a psychopathic personality is a person of unsound mind."
Judge Arnold cited' 07 with approval the following statement by
his colleague, Judge Miller, in Hart v. United States: "The rule sug-
gested by appellant would become a refuge for ill-tempered, irrespon-
sible citizens; it would put a premium upon lack of self-control and
would penalize the reasonable man, . . . because of the restraint
which he practices in his dealings with his fellows." 10' The question
103. Id. at 107; 328 U.S. at 468n.
104. In the early part of his charge the judge stated to the jury the following:
"The prosecution contends that the defendant being of sound memory and
discretion did kill Catherine Reardon purposely and of his deliberated and pre-
meditated malice and is guilty of murder in the first degree." At 105.
105. 80 App. D.C. 96, 149 F.2d 28 (1945).
106. Id. at 97, 149 F.2d at 29.
107. Id. at 97n., 149 F.2d at 29n.
108. 76 App. D.C. 193, 195, 130 F.2d 456, 458 (1942).
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in that case was whether there was sufficient provocation to reduce the
offense from murder to manslaughter-a question entirely different
from that in the principal case.
Judge Arnold, however, did not refer to the following statement
of Judge Miller in McAffee v. United States 9 in which the question,
like that in the principal case, was whether the defendant was guilty
of first degree murder: "There was conflicting evidence upon the sub-
ject of appellant's intoxication and of his mental condition. Under the
circumstances the question was one of fact and was properly submitted
to the jury to determine whether, by reason of drunkenness or other-
wise, appellant's condition was such as to make him incapable of de-
liberation or premeditation." 110 The phrase "drunkenness or other-
wise" follows the wording of the Supreme Court in Hopt v. People."'
The statement in so far as it dealt with the question of the defendant's
"mental condition" was directly applicable to the principal case. This
statement was repeated by Judge Miller in Mergner v. United States 2
decided February 19, 1945, just two months before the Fisher case
was decided.
The following statement by the Court of Appeals of the District
is likewise applicable to the evidence in the Fisher case:
"Statutes like ours, which distinguish deliberate and pre-
meditated murder from other murder, reflect a belief that one who
meditates an intent to kill and then deliberately executes it is
more dangerous, more culpable or less capable of reformation
than one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the prospect of the
death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate than
from impulsive murder. The deliberate killer is guilty of first
degree murder; the impulsive killer is not." 113
109. 72 App. D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199 (1940).
110. Id. at 66, 111 F.2d at 205.
111. See note 72 supra.
112. 79 App. D.C. 373, 374, 147 F.2d 572, 573 (1945).
113. Edgerton, J. in Bullock v. United States, 74 App. D. C. 220, 221, 122 F.2d
213, 214 (1941). The Court in this case held erroneous an instruction by the trial
court that "though 'deliberate and premeditated malice' involves turning over in the
mind an intention to kill, 'it does not take any appreciable length of time to turn a
thought of that kind over in your mind."' Regarding this instruction Edgerton, J.
said: "To speak of premeditation and deliberation which are instantaneous, or which
take no appreciable time, is a contradiction in terms. It deprives the statutory re-
quirement of all meaning and destroys the statutory distinction between first and second
degree murder." At 220. In Jones v. United States, 175 F.2d 544 (1949), the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held erroneous the following instruction by the
District Court for the Territory of Alaska: "'Deliberate and premeditated malice'
is presumed by law to exist where the intention to unlawfully take life is deliberately
formed in the mind of the actor, and thereafter such intention is carried out. There
need be no appreciable length of time between the formation of the intent to kill and
the killing, itself; it may be as instantaneous as successive thought." At 549. Re-
garding this instruction Pope, Cir. *J. speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals stated
the following: "The words 'deliberate and premeditated' are not such words of art
as to be without meaning to jurors. Left to their own devices, with nothing but the
language of the statute to guide them, the jury might be able to appreciate the essen-
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On certiorari to the Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed 114
by a vote of five (Stone, C. J. and Black, Reed, Douglas and Burton,
JJ.) to three, Justice Jackson not participating and Justices Murphy," 5
Frankfurter 116 and Rutledge 117 dissenting in separate opinions. The
opinion of the majority was written by Justice Reed.
In his discussion of the evidence presented at the trial Justice
Reed disposed of the testimony of defendant's medical witness that
the defendant was "a psychopathic personality" by quoting the follow-
ing statement 1s from a magazine article by two English physicians:
"The only conclusion that seems warrantable is that, at some
time or other and by some reputable authority, the term psycho-
pathic personality has been used to designate every conceivable
type of abnormal character." 19
Justice Reed did not, however, refer to the testimony of the Gov-
ernment's medical witness that "a psychopathic personality is a person
of unsound mind." 120
The opinion of the majority was based to a large extent upon
the case of United States v. Lee,' 2' decided by the Supreme Court of
tial difference between first and second degree murder. But when the court, which
might properly advise the jury that no particular length of time is necessary, proceeds
to define deliberation and premeditation in terms which lay emphasis upon 'no ap-
preciable time' and 'instantaneous,' the statutory distinctions are rendered meaning-
less." At 551.
114. The decision of the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States is discussed in
the following:
Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A Coinnentary on
Fisher v. United States, 34 CALiF. L. REv. 625 (1946); Weihofen and Overholser,
Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Critne, 56 YALE L. J. 959 (1947); note,
Premeditation and Mental Capacity, 46 COL. L. Rav. 1005 (1946) ; note, Mental Defect
-Partial Responsibility, Wis. L. RaV. 109 (1947); Case note, Partial Insanity, 20
So. C.sIF. L. REv. 95 (1946) ; Recent Case, 20 TEMP. L. REv. 155 (1946) ; Comment,
25 TEX L. Rav. 295 (1947).
115. Justice Murphy dissented on the grounds (1) that the "correct answer" to
the issue in the case was given by the Supreme Court in Hopt v. People, when it said
that "the question whether the accused is in such a condition of mind, by reason of
drunkenness or otherwise, as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily
becomes a material subject of consideration by the jury" and (2) that mental impair-
ment should be given the same effect as intoxication and passion in negativing de-
liberation and premeditation.
116. justice Frankfurter concurred in justice Murphy's opinion and added the
following grounds:
(1) The charge of the trial judge did not adequately present to the jury the
issue of premeditation and (2) "The evidence in its entirety hardly provides a
basis for a finding of premeditation." At 480.
117. Justice Rutledge concurred in justice Murphy's opinion and also stated his
agreement with the first ground given by Justice Frankfurter.
118. At 467.
119. Curran and Mallinson, Psychopathic Personality, 90 J. MENT. ScL 266, 278
(1944).
120. Transcript of Record, 92.
121. 4 Mackey 489 (1886).
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the District of Columbia in 1886 before the statute dividing murder
into degrees was enacted. The indictment in the Lee case was for
murder and counsel for the defense requested the trial judge to charge
that "if the jury find from the evidence that there was such a degree
of mental unsoundness existing at the time of the homicide as to
render the defendant incapable of premeditation and of forming such
an intent as the jury believe the circumstances of this case would rea-
sonably impute to a man of sound mind, they may consider such degree
of mental unsoundness in determining the question whether the act
was murder or manslaughter." 122 The trial judge refused to give this
instruction and this refusal was held not to be error. The decision was
clearly correct as "premeditation" is not a requisite of murder. Jus-
tice Reed considered the decision applicable to the present case and
expressed the opinion that the separation of murder into degrees did
not introduce "a new situation into the law of the District of Colum-
bia." '" In so doing he confused "malice aforethought", which is the
requisite of both first and second degree murder, with the "premedita-
tion" required for murder in the first degree. This distinction was
clearly recognized by the Court of Appeals for the District in a case
decided in 1939. Vinson J. speaking for the Court stated the following:
"Under the District of Columbia statute, a homicide committed pur-
posely and with deliberate and premeditated malice is murder in the
first degree. A homicide committed with malice aforethought, without
deliberation and premeditation, is murder in the second degree." 124
Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissenting opinion that the
decision in United States v. Lee was not applicable to the present case 125
and called attention to the following statement by counsel for the
Government in the Lee case: "In jurisdictions where murder is divided
into two degrees-murder in the first degree requiring deliberation and
premeditation; in other words, actual malice-it has been frequently
held that evidence of mental excitement resulting from drunkenness
and, perhaps, also of other abnormal conditions of the mind not amount-
ing to insanity, may reduce an unprovoked homicide to murder in the
second degree; but it has always been held that such evidence cannot
of itself reduce the crime to manslaughter." 126
One of the most important statements in the opinion of the
majority is the following:
122. Id. at 492.
123. Fisher v. United States, 473.
124. Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 135, 107 F.2d 297, 301 (1939).
125. Fisher v. United States, 489n.
126. United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489, 493 (1886).
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"It is urged, also, that since evidence of intoxication to a state
where one guilty of the crime of murder may not be capable
of deliberate premeditation requires in the District of Columbia an
instruction to that effect (McAffee v. United States, 72 App. D.C.
60, 111 F. 2d 199), courts from this must deduce that disease
and congenital defects, for which the accused may not be respon-
sible, may also reduce the crime of murder from first to second
degree." 127
Justice Reed answered this contention by referring to the lan-
guage employed by the Supreme Court in Hopt v. People.2 ' He at-
tempted to lessen the effect of this statement by saying :
"The cases cited by this Court to support this statement are
all instances of intoxication. Since drunkenness alone is specifically
mentioned, the 'or otherwise' may refer to various stages of
intoxication." 129
Although all the cases cited by the Supreme Court in support of
their pronouncement involved intoxication there were in three of them
statements broad enough to cover mental states other than intoxica-
tion.'3 0 It was undoubtedly for this reason that the Court used the
phrase "or otherwise." Justice Reed's contention that "or otherwise"
may refer to various stages of drunkenness cannot be supported by the
127. At 473n.
128. "But when a statute establishing different degrees of murder requires de-
liberate premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the question
whether the accused is in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness or other-
wise, as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a material
subject of consideration by the jury." Gray, J. in Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 634
(1881).
129. At 475n. Emphasis added.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in two cases expressed the opinion that the
statement of Justice Gray in Hopt v. People was applicable to a disordered mental
condition as well as to intoxication. Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 287 (1889) and
Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 135 (1901).
130. "If the mental status required by law to constitute crime be one of delibera-
tion and premeditation, and drunkenness or other cause excludes the existence of such
mental state, then the crime is not excused by drunkenness or such other cause, but
has not in fact been committed." Turley, J. in Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663,
670 (1849). Emphasis added.
"But when the question is, whether a party is guilty of murder in the first degree,
it becomes indispensable that the jury should form an opinion as to the actual state
of mind with which this act was done. All murder in the first degree (except that com-
mitted by poison, and by lying in wait) must be perpetrated wilfully, deliberately,
maliciously and premeditatedly. The jury must ascertain, as a matter of fact, that
the accused was in this state of mind, when the act was done. Now, according to the
cases of Swan v. the State (4 Humph. 136) and Pirtle v. the State (9 Humph. 663),
anry fact that will shed light upon this subject may be looked to by them, and may
constitute legitimate proof for their consideration." Green, J. in Haile v. State, 11
Humph. (Tenn.) 154, 157 (1850). Emphasis added.
"If it was deliberate and premeditated, it was murder of the first degree; other-
wise it was murder of the second degree; and in determining the degree any evidence
tending to show the mental statu, of the defendant was a proper subject for the con-
sideration of the jury." Cope, J. in People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544, 545 (1863).
Emphasis added.
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cases cited nor by any proper meaning of the word "otherwise". With
regard to the case of McAffee v. United States it has already been
pointed out that the language of the opinion applies to "mental condi-
tion" as well as to "intoxication" and includes the phrase "intoxication
or otherwise", as used by the Supreme Court in Hopt v. People."3'
Justice Reed reached the conclusion, from a study of the decisions
of the District of Columbia courts, that "it is the, established law in
the District that an accused in a criminal trial is not entitled to an
instruction based upon evidence of mental weakness short of legal
insanity, which would reduce his crime from first to second degree
murder." 132 In none of the cases cited by Justice Reed to sustain his
conclusion is this problem raised."3' On the other hand the cases of
McAffee v. United States 3 and Mergner v. United States,13 5 in
which the opinion of the Court supports the opposite conclusion, were
not cited. In both of these cases, as already pointed out, the Court
said:
"There was conflicting evidence upon the subject of appel-
lant's intoxication and of his mental condition. Under the cir-
cumstances the question was one of fact and was properly sub-
mitted to the jury to determine whether by reason of drunkenness
or otherwise, appellant's condition was such as to make him in-
capable of deliberation or premeditation." -11
Justice Reed made the following statement: "It may be that
psychiatry has now reached a position of certainty in its diagnosis and
prognosis which will induce Congress to enact the rule of responsibility
for crime for which petitioner contends. For this Court to force the
131. Supra page 276.
132. United States v. Fisher, 473.
133. The cases cited are United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489, 495; Guiteau's
Case, 10 Fed. 161, 168, 182; Bolden v. United States, 63 App. D.C. 45, 69 F.2d 121;
Owens v. United States, 66 App. D.C. 104, 85 F.2d 270, 272; Hill v. United States,
22 App. D.C. 395, 401; Hamilton v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 382, 386-391; Burge
v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 524, 527-30; Hart v. United States, 76 U.S. App. D.C.
193, 130 F.2d 456, 458; Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 107 F.2d 297,
302-303. As already pointed out, United States v. Lee was a prosecution for
murder before the statute 'dividing murder into degrees was enacted. Guiteau's Case
was also a prosecution for murder. In Owens v. United States the defendant was
convicted of second degree murder and contended that the evidence did not support
this finding. In Bolden v. United States and Hart v. United States the question was
whether there was sufficient provocation to reduce an intentional killing from murder
to manslaughter. In Bishop v. United States it was decided that volunary drunken-
ness would not reduce murder to manslaughter. Vinson, J. in his opinion clearly
pointed out the difference between first and second degree murder under the District
of Columbia statute. At 135.
In Hill v. United States, Hamilton v. United States and Burge v. United States
the question under discussion by the court concerned the sufficiency of the indictment
for first degree murder.
134. 72 App. D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199 (1940).
135. 79 App. D.C. 373, 147 F.2d 572 (1945).
136. McAfee v. United States at 66; Mergner v. United States at 374.
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District of Columbia to adopt such a requirement for criminal trials
would involve a fundamental change in the common law theory of
responsibility." 137
This statement involves a misunderstanding of the meaning of
"responsibility," which does not depend upon any theories of psy-
chiatry but is a purely legal conception. This was clearly expressed
by Stephen in his History of the Criminal Law when he said:
"The question, 'What are the mental elements of respon-
sibility'? is, and must be, a legal question. It can not be anything
else, for the meaning of responsibility is liability to punishment;
and if criminal law does not determine who are to be punished
under given circumstances, it determines nothing." 138
Responsibility does not exist in the abstract. In each case the problem
is whether a particular defendant has the state of mind required for
the commission of a particular crime-in this case whether Julius
Fisher at the time he did the killing was of sound memory and discretion
and acted purposely with deliberate and premeditated malice, as re-
quired by the District of Columbia statute defining first degree murder.
As already pointed out the provision of the statute, which was the
basis of the charge against Fisher, reads as follows: "Whoever being
of sound memory and discretion, kills another purposely, of deliberate
and premeditated malice . . . is guilty of murder in the first degree."
It will be readily noted that this provision contains five mental require-
ments, viz., (1) sound memory, (2) discretion, (3) purposely, (4)
deliberate malice and (5) premeditated malice. In his request for in-
structions counsel for the defense included all five of the requirements,
but the trial judge when charging the jury mentioned only the last
three. He defined first degree murder as "the killing of a human being
purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice", omitting the
requirements of "sound memory" and "discretion". This provision
of the statute was not referred to in the opinion of the Court of Appeals
nor in any of the opinions rendered in the Supreme Court. This omis-
sion was not in accord with the fundamental rule of statutory construc-
tion, frequently announced by the Supreme Court, that effect should be
given to every word of a statute. 3 9
137. At 476.
138. 2 STEPHEN, HisToRy oF THE CramiNAL LAW oF ENGLAND, 183 (1883).
"Mental disease constitutes a medical problem, and the diagnosis and symp-
tomatology of it should be determined by physicians. Criminal responsibility, on the
other hand, is a legal question, and the rules for determining such responsibility should
be fixed by the law, and administered by the legal profession." Keedy, Insanity and
Crimibd Responsibility, 30 HAiv. L. REv. 535, 737 (1917).
139. "We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any
part of its language. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance
and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon's
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It may possibly be contended that the requirements, "sound
memory" and "discretion", do not add to the effect of the other mental
requirements of first degree murder since it is sometimes said that they
are requisites of common law murder.' 40 Such a contention can not be
accepted for two reasons: (1) It would make the added provisions
meaningless and of no effect, which would be contrary to an established
Abridgement, sect. 2, it was said that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be con-
strued that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant.' This rule has been repeated innumerable times." Strong, J. in
Market Company v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115 (1879). Accord: Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882) ; Petri v. Commercial National Bank, 142 U.S.
644, 650 (1892); Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Mottley, 219 U.S.
467, 475 (1911); Ex parte The Public National Bank of New York, 278 U.S. 101
(1928). In the last case Sutherland, J. stated the following: "No rule of statutory
construction has been more definitely stated or more often repeated than the cardinal
rule that 'significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word.'" At 104.
This rule has been followed in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. United States ex tel, Gribble v. Ballinger, 33 App. D.C. 211, 215 (1909);
Fisher v. District of Columbia, 82 App. D.C. 371, 372, 164 F.2d 707, 708 (1947).
140. Coke defined murder as follows: "Murder is when a man of sound memory,
and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth . . . any reasonable creature . . . with
malice forethought." 3 INsT. 47 (1644). Emphasis added. Blackstone quotes Coke
as saying that murder is "when a person of sound memory and discretion killeth
any reasonable creature . . . with malice aforethought." 4 BL. CoM. 195 (1769).
Emphasis added. It will be noted that Blackstone misquoted Coke, substituting "dis-
cretion" for "age of discretion."
The definitions of murder by the following early writers and courts do not con-
tain either "sound memory" or "discretion": 1 HAvxINs P. C. c. 31, § 3 (1716);
1 HALE P. C. 425 (1736); FosTER C. L. 256 (1767); 1 EAST P. C. 214 (1803);
Regina v. Mawgridge, Kel. (J.) 119, 124 (1707) ; Rex v. Oneby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1487
(1727).
The leading English writer on Criminal Law, Russell, on the basis of the above
citations, defined murder as "the killing any person under the king's peace, with
malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied by law." RussEL., CmMS
AND MISDEMEANORS, 613 (1819). This definition was continued through six editions.
In the seventh (1910) edition the editors, without any explanation, added after the
word "killing" the phrase "by any person of sound memory and discretion." P. 655.
This addition to the original definition was continued in the eighth (1923) and ninth
(1936) editions. The following English writers do not include the elements of"sound memory" and "discretion" in the definition of murder: CHERRY, OurLIN OF
CRIMINAL LAw 35 (1892) ; STEPHEN, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAw 225 (7th ed. 1926) ;
IENNY, OuTiNEs OF CRIMINAL LAW 146 (15th ed. 1936); WILSHE E CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 80 (3d ed. 1922) ; HARRIS AND WnLSHEE, CRIMINAL LAW 194
(15th ed. 1933).
In this country Wharton, citing the same authorities as Russell, gives a definition
of murder, which includes "sound memory and discretion." LAW OF HOMIcIDE c. 1, § 2
(3d ed. 1907). The following American authors, unlike Wharton, do not include
either "sound memory" or "discretion" in their definitions: 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 627-2 (1892) ; BuRDicK, LAw OF CRmIx § 415 (1946); CLARC AND MARSHALL, LAw
OF Camms § 239 (3d ed. 1927) ; CLARK, CRIMINAL LAw 206 (3d ed. Mikell 1915) ;
KERR, HOmIcIDE 65 (1891); MAY, CRIMINAL LAw § 163 (4th ed. 1938); M .LLER,
CRIMINAL LAW 262 (1934).
Cox, J. in his charge to the jury in Guitea's Case stated that "murder is com-
mitted where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills a reasonable
creature in being, and in the peace of the United States, with malice aforethought."
10 Fed. 161, 162 (1881). He also stated that sound memory and discretion is "only
a technical expression for a sound mind." At 165.
In Hill v. United States, 22 App. D.C. 395 (1903), where the question involved
was the sufficiency of an indictment for first degree murder Alvey, C.J. expressed
the opinion, based on the statement by Blackstone, that "sound memory and discre-
tion" were requisites of common law murder.
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rule of interpretation. 141  (2) As defined in the statute first and second
degree murder combined are coextensive with common law murder, but
the requirements of sound memory and discretion are employed only
in the definition of first degree murder, the only mental requirement
for second degree murder being malice aforethought. 4 It clearly fol-
lows from the foregoing that Congress intended that effect should be
given to the requirements of "sound memory" and "discretion" in the
statute on first degree murder. In this connection "memory" means
mental capacity143 and "discretion" means "the power of deciding or
acting according to one's judgment." 144 It is thus clear that there is a
direct connection between the statutory requirements of "sound
memory" and "discretion" and the testimony of the medical witness
for the defendant that he was a "psychopathic personality" combined
with the testimony of the Government's medical witness that "the
psychopathic personality is a person of unsound mind." Consequently
the conclusion seems to follow inescapably that it was substantial error
for the trial judge to refuse to charge that the jury should consider
the mental characteristics of the defendant in determining whether he
at the time of the killing was of sound memory and discretion.
141. United States v. Southern Pacific Company, 230 Fed. 270 (1916); Eversole
v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487 (1916) ; Southern Railway Company v. United
States Casualty Company, 136 Va. 475, 118 S.E. 266 (1923).
142. "Whoever with malice aforethought, except as provided in sections 22-2401,
22-2402, kills another, is guilty of murder in the second degree." D. C. CODE § 22-2403.
Sections 22-2401 and 22-2402 relate to murder in the first degree.
143. "If an infant under age alienates and dies under age, his heir can enter
because his father could have entered at all times. But it is otherwise where a man
who is not of sane memory alienates, for he himself could [not] enter, nor, conse-
quently, his heir. And this in a Formedon, etc." STATHAm, ABRIDGMENT OF THE
LAW, 1467(?), (transl. by Klingelsmith) 618.
"Nota si hone qui est de nwn saize im orie, que est a dit en latin, q i non est
compos mentis . . . LiTrETox, TENURES, 185 (Rastell, 1534).
Ceo est quant un tua auter oue felonious volunte o ittente, quel chose hone de non
sane nenwrie, ne peut faire. STAUNDFORDE, LEs PLExs DEL CoRoN, lib. I, c. 9 (1583).
"But if a man being of good memorie make a Charter of Feofment of certaine
lands whereof hee is seised . . . that is a good feoffment." PExINs, PROFITABLE
BOOK § 22 (1642).
"If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense . . . and after his plea
and before his trial, become of none sane mnemory, he shall not be tried; or, if after his
trial he become of non sane mentory, he shall not receive judgment; or, if after judg-
ment he becomes of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of
sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution." 1 HALE
P. C. 34 (1736). Emphasis added.
"MEmoRY. Mental Capacity; . . . This word, as used in jurisprudence to denote
one of the psychological elements necessary in the making of a valid will or contract
or the commission of a crime, implies the mental power to conduct a consecutive train
of thought, or an orderly planning of affairs, by recalling correctly the past states of
the mind and past events, and arranging them in their due order of sequence and in
their logical relations with the events and mental states of the present." BLcx's LA-w
DicTioxARY (3d ed. 1933).
144. OxFoRD DIcTioNARY.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that whenever Con-
gress in legislating for the District of Columbia has adopted the word-
ing of a state statute the construction given to this statute in the state
has also been adopted and should be followed. In a leading case,
decided in 1897, Gray, J. stated the following: "The resemblance be-
tween the provisions of the Massachusetts statute of 1860 and the act of
Congress of 1864 is so remarkable, that it is evident that the latter
was taken from the former. This being so, the known and settled con-
struction, which those statutes had received in Massachusetts before the
original enactment of the act of Congress, must be considered as having
been adopted by Congress with the text thus expounded." 145
It has been shown that the District of Columbia statute on first
degree murder follows the wording of the Ohio statute and that the
Ohio courts have decided that mental derangement must be considered
in determining whether the defendant was able to deliberate and pre-
meditate. It follows from the above rule of the Supreme Court that
the same construction should be given to the statute of the District of
Columbia.
It is submitted that the following reasons would have fully sup-
ported a reversal by the Supreme Court of the decision of the District
Court of Appeals:
1. The opinion of the Supreme Court in Hopt v. People
regarding "drunkenness or otherwise".'46 This view was ex-
pressed by the three dissenting Justices, Murphy, Frankfurter and
Rutledge.
2. The clearly expressed opinion of the Court of Appeals in
McAffee v. United States and Mergizer v. United States.
147
3. The erroneous refusal of the trial court to charge, as
requested, that the jury should consider the mental characteristics
of the defendant in determining whether he was of "sound memory
and discretion" as required by the statute. 4 '
4. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, that the mental
condition of the defendant should be considered by the jury in
145. Willis v. Eastern Trust and Banking Company, 169 U.S. 295, 307 (1897).
To the same effect see Metropolitan Railroad Company v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558 (1887)
and Capital Traction Company v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899). In the latter case Gray, J.
stated the following: "By a familiar canon of interpretation, heretofore applied by
this court whenever Congress, in legislating for the District of Columbia, has bor-
rowed from the statutes of a State provisions which had received in that State a known
and settled construction before their enactment by Congress, that construction must
be deemed to have been adopted by Congress together with the text which it ex-
pounded, and the provisions must be construed as they were understood at the time in
the State." At 36.
146. See Keedy, Insmity and Crtiminc Responsibility, op. cit. supra note 138, at
552; GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw, 202 (1925).
147. See pages 281 and 285.
148. See pages 286-288.
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determining whether he was able to deliberate and premeditate,
was controlling, since the District of Columbia statute on first
degree murder follows the wording of the Ohio statute.'49
III.
It is difficult to determine by what process of reasoning some courts
can decide that self-produced intoxication is a proper matter for con-
sideration by the jury in determining whether the mental elements of
first degree murder are present but that mental disease may not be so
considered.' It would seem that there was more reason for giving
consideration to mental disease than to intoxication. This idea was
expressed more forcefully by a New Jersey judge when he said "The
law is not the creation of such barbarous and insensible animal nature
as to extend a more lenient legal rule to the case of a drunkard, whose
mental faculties are disturbed by his own will and conduct, than to the
case of a poor demented creature afflicted by the hand of God." "I' It
is interesting to speculate how this judge would characterize the action
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in deciding that
mental disease should not be considered when it had previously decided
that where a killing was definitely planned and intoxication was
deliberately produced as an aid in accomplishing the killing the crime
could not be murder in the first degree if at the time of the killing the
intoxication prevented the killer from deliberating and premeditating.152
The writer will hazard an explanation why some courts have be-
come confused in their reasoning when confronted with the problem
of determining the effect of various forms and degrees of mental disease
on the mental requirements of particular crimes. The confusion started
when the English judges were asked in 1843 by the House of Lords,
following the acquittal of M'Naghten of a charge of murder by reason
of his insanity, to state the law regarding insanity as a defense to a
charge of crime. As this law had not been previously formulated the
judges in their answers to the questions of the Lords stated as rules
of law the theories of medical witnesses who had previously testified in
the trial of homicide cases.' 53 These medical theories are now obsolete
149. See page 289.
150. The authors of a scholarly article ask the following pertinent question: "how
can one justify holding a person guilty of a deliberate and premeditated killing when
he did not deliberate and premeditate, and, indeed was incapable of deliberating and
premeditating?" Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting Degree of
Crime, op. cit. supra note 114, at 972.
151. Kalisch, J. in State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 694, 133 Atl. 274, 285 (1926).
152. Sabens v. United States, 40 App. D.C. 440 (1913).
153. In the trial of Hadfield for treason in firing a pistol at King George III
Dr. Creighton testified that Hadfield was suffering from an insane delusion. As a
result of the opinion formed by Dr. Creighton, Hadfield's counsel, Thomas Erskine,
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and are opposed to present scientific knowledge, 5 4 but the rules of law
based on them are still followed by many courts in this country.
Another source of confusion in this country was the charge to the
jury by Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
the case of Commonwealth v. Rogers "45 in 1844, one year after the
answers of the judges in M'Naghten's Case. This charge contained a
jumble of psychological, medical, ethical and legal conceptions. Fol-
lowing is a list of these conceptions in the order in which they appear
in the charge: intelligence, intent, purpose, reason, mental powers, will,
conscience, mental disease, intellectual power, morality, partial insanity,
memory, judgment, delusion, impressions, responsibility, right, wrong,
knowledge, consciousness, justice, duty, punishment, impulse, melan-
choly, propriety, monomania, belief, design, motives, hallucination,
paroxysm, accountability, responsibility and insanity. Chief Justice
Shaw's charge, apparently because it suggests much learning, has had
an extensive influence with courts and even legal writers.'56 The
stated to the jury that "Delusion, where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the
true character of insanity." Hadfield's Case 27 How. St. Tr. 1282, 1314 (1800). In
the case of Queen v. Oxford in 1840 Dr. John Connolly testified that the defendant
was unable "to distinguish right from wrong." Queen v. Oxford, 4 St. Tr. (N. S.)
498, 540. In the trial of M'Naughton in 1843 Dr. E. T. Monro testified that the act
of the defendant in killing the deceased was committed "whilst under a delusion." He
was then asked: "Is it consistent with the pathology of insanity, that a partial delusion
may exist, depriving the person of all self-control whilst the other faculties may be
sound"? The answer was "Certainly; monomania may exist with general sanity."
Queen v. M'Naughton, 4 St. Tr. (N. S.) 847, 919. The name of the defendant is
spelled "M'Naghten" in 10 Cl. & Fin. 200.
"A great variety of symptomic tests of responsibility was early announced as is
shown by the following statement: Thence has arisen so many ridiculous and untenable
opinions, unsound and illogical propositions, unsafe and dangerous precedents. A
regards motive as sufficient test; B requires knowledge of morality or immorality of
act; C demands a comprehension of its relations to the law; D argues from the
presence or absence of self-restraint; E considers the existence of delusion essential;
F associates delusion with act; G rejects the mental unless corroborated by the physical
condition; H commingles insanity with crime; and ALL contribute somewhat to involve
the question in almost inextricable perplexity. We might extend this list: to do so
would be merely to repeat what we have already propounded." WILLIAMs, UNSOUND-
NESS OF MIND, 205 (London, 1856).
154. "The knowledge test in all its forms, and the delusion test, are medical theories
introduced in immature stages of science in the dim light of earlier times, and subse-
quently, upon more extensive observations and more criticical examinations, repudiated
by the medical profession." Doe, J. in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 437 (1870). To
the same effect see Somerville, J. in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 584 (1886). For
citation of other authorities see Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, op. cit.
supra note 138, at 736.
155. 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500 (1844).
156. The charge of Chief Justice Shaw to the jury in the Rogers case has been
described as a "lucid exposition of the criminal law of insanity." 2 GREENLEAF, EVI-
DENCE § 372 note (16th ed. 1899).
"It (the charge) is in harmony with the rule stated by Chief Justice Shaw more
than half a century ago, and which has been incorporated into the text-books and
become elementary." Cassoday, C.J. in Eckert v. State, 114 Wis. 160, 163 (1902).
"Perhaps the most quoted of the early cases is Chief Justice Shaw's charge to
the jury in Commonwealth v. Rogers, in 1844." WEIROFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL LAw 47 (1933).
See also Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 38 (1888).
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jurors, to whom the charge was addressed, were not greatly, impressed
with its clarity, because after hearing the charge and considering it for
several hours, they returned to the court room and asked the Chief
Justice the following question: "What degree of insanity will amount
to a justification of the offence"? 117
In the Fisher Case Justice Reed cited M'Naghten's Case, he quoted
the opinion of two English physicians, 5 ' he spoke of the diagnosis and
prognosis of psychiatry,159 he referred to classifications of mentality 160
and to the views of criminologists and psychologists,16' he discussed
"partial responsibility" 162 and "insanity in the legal sense","e but he
did not refer to the provision of the statute requiring "sound memory
and discretion" nor to the fact that this requirement is specifically
included in the requested instruction, nor did he mention the testimony
of the Government's medical witness that "a psychopathic personality
is a person of unsound mind."
When the problem of the Fisher Case again arises a correct solu-
tion can be expected if the judges will not try to be amateur psychia-
trists 16 but will reason as lawyers, applying the requirements of the
statute to the evidence of the particular case.
157. At 506.
158. United States v. Fisher at 467n.
159. Id. at 476.
160. Id. at 475.
161. Ibid.
162. Id. at 470 and 475. See convincing criticism of "partial responsibility" by
Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime, A Commentary on Fisher
v. United States, op. cit. supra note 114, at 630n.
163. United States v. Fisher at 470.
164. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Fisher Case, aptly said: "This case
has been much beclouded by laymen's ventures into psychiatry." At 477.
"The difficulty has been that the courts in dealing with the defense of insanity
have been concerned to such a degree in describing psychological phenomena, that
they inhibited themselves from seeing the application of general principles of law to
the problem before them." Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, op. cit. .supra
note 138, at 553.
